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THE LAW SCHOOL: RECOLLECTIONS 
AND THOUGHTS FOR THE FUTURE 
Thomas Eichelbaum* 
This paper was presented as a lecture on "Capital Law School Day" organised by the New 
Zealand Institute of Advanced Legal Studies to mark the occasion of the centenary of the Faculty of 
Law, Victoria University of Wellington in 1999. 
Those making the arrangements, the entirely admirable arrangements, for this Seminar 
may not have known that His Excellency, Sir Michael Hardie Boys and I commenced our 
law studies on the same day. That is understandable, given the continued youthful vigour 
of His Excellency in body and mind. However, regarding our student days we necessarily 
cover the same period, so I will have to do my best not to be repetitive. Incidentally, His 
Excellency was modest in excluding himself from the ranks of the really bright ones. He 
was the Senior Scholar in our class, and one of the early editors-in-chief of the University 
Law Review. 
His Excellency's reminiscences will have kindled your memories, as they have mine. I 
recall the Law Library's move to a separate room, which at the start my friend Eric 
Freeman and I guarded on alternate evenings. Eric, now retired after serving as 
Ombudsman in Western Australia, is in the audience today. 
The perspective from which I speak, then, is of a student in the early post-war era and 
of a part-time lecturer in the period soon after completing my degree. In both respects I 
feel my experience was reasonably typical. 
The custom then developing was to do the first year of study full time. In that year we 
were supposed to obtain an overview of a legal system by studying Roman Law. Since 
neither the substance nor the procedure of the Roman system bore much resemblance to 
the English, while as His Excellency has mentioned there were certain fascinations, not the 
least the personality of the lecturer, personally I felt this was of limited help. The current 
equivalent, Laws 101, The Legal System, seems to achieve the objective in a better way and 
at the same time, I imagine in a manner more interesting to the students. 
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In the next three years, by taking four and sometimes five subjects a year, one could 
complete sufficient of the course to gain admission as a solicitor. As with most, I did that 
part of the course part time. From the point of view of an increase in pay, and status, and 
(if you were decided on becoming a litigator) gaining court experience, early admission 
had attractions. Even for a good student this was a heavy programme, the more so if, as 
was the case with most, you wanted to play sport, take part in student activities, have 
some social life and progress in your employment; but it was manageable. There was an 
obvious risk that among those competing priorities study would come last, at least until 
exams were approaching. 
In the fifth year one could take things easy, as there were only two subjects to complete 
to bring up the total for the degree, which from memory comprised 19. You could then be 
admitted as a barrister, thus becoming a barrister and solicitor, and be capped LLB. 
I try to avoid Latin phrases but one which, because of its precision, has often tended to 
pop up in my mind was cui bono, especially while I was Chief Justice and listened to 
various propositions from a variety of quarters. Who benefited by the curriculum of that 
era? I doubt that it brought great satisfaction to teaching members of the Faculty. From the 
point of view of an impecunious student, it helped, although not much at first, having 
regard to the pitiful salary scales of the day.  My employers however, whose partner I later 
became, grumbled that they had to pay 32/6d for services inferior to those which only a 
decade or so earlier, they themselves had provided for a mere 10/- a week. But the earlier 
you qualified the sooner you were in a position to get something approaching a living 
wage. 
In case all this sounds like the playing of violins, I record that the instructions were to 
lace our presentation with recollections from our student days. 
Undoubtedly, the part-time system enabled young law clerks quickly to obtain 
rudimentary legal experience. There was no formal instruction equivalent to today's block 
courses of "professionals", although you picked up something useful in Civil Procedure 
and Conveyancing, two of the compulsory subjects. What else you were taught workwise 
depended largely on the patience of your employers - mine, I acknowledge, were 
extraordinarily patient. One was an expert on civil procedure and it was much easier to 
ask him about what was the appropriate step than look it up. Eventually he would 
elaborately take down his volume of Sim and say "Charging orders nisi, did you say?" at 
the same time leafing through the index. Given the notoriously bad index to Sim this 
would take some time - McGechan had not yet been written, indeed McGechan was a 
polite schoolboy the senior students sometimes saw at his father's home on Sunday 
evenings. Eventually I got the message and looked things up for myself. 
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As a result of the system, by the time students finished their degree course they had 
had four or more years of practical experience. In a firm sufficiently large to take in one or 
more law clerks each year, only a year would be spent on manual and menial work such as 
deliveries and filing, and from then on you would graduate to real, if at first relatively 
trifling, legal work. As soon as you were admitted as a solicitor you could make 
appearances in the Magistrates Court. There you could practise your advocacy skills on 
minor prosecutions and on civil cases about what in today's terms now seem incredibly 
small amounts. I do not know how such disputes are resolved today, but certainly no law 
firm would now accept instructions to litigate minute problems of this kind. It was an 
advantage that if the budding advocate made a real hash of the case, not much harm was 
done to anyone. 
Because of the much smaller numbers, both in the profession and of students, many 
law clerks had the golden opportunity of working in close proximity to an experienced 
lawyer, or even a leader in the profession. Thus one could absorb, partly by instruction but 
more often osmosis, the arts of the profession and equally importantly, its customs and 
ethics. Only a lucky few would be in an equivalent position today, leaving a real and, it 
might be thought, potentially dangerous gap in legal education which both the universities 
and the profession need to fill. I support those, whose numbers I know include Dean Brian 
Brooks, who advocate that ethics must be taught. 
So the students of the day benefited in various ways but basically were on a night 
school regime and, despite the heroic efforts of the lecturers, obtained a night school 
education. 
Recently, in connection with the launch of the Centennial Issue of the Law Review, I re-
read the late Professor McGechan's seminal 1953 article on teaching by the case method. As 
he emphasised, this approach demanded a considerable and sustained degree of 
preparation by the students and he made it clear that lack of time for preparation would 
not be an acceptable excuse. He said that the first student who offered that explanation in 
class spent the next three-quarters of an hour more or less reading the set case on his feet. 
Failure to have a grasp of the case, Professor McGechan threatened, would result in more 
cross examination, not less. Revisiting the article, I saw it served clear notice of requiring 
more than the average part-time student was accustomed to deliver and may have tolled 
the knell for part-time study. 
What is the function of a law school? Professor McGechan answered: (1) to teach and 
train lawyers; (2) to develop legal knowledge by research and publication; and (3) to co-
operate with other social sciences for the better understanding of the law and the 
betterment of applied social science. I am not sure today's professors would frame the 
prescription the same way, at the least, "teaching lawyers" would need to be interpreted so 
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as to include the many who will not practise law, while "training" is now carried out 
mainly outside the universities. 
If we are looking at the competing merits of different methods of teaching lawyers, I 
suppose it is a natural tendency to defend the system under which you grew up, but so far 
as my own legal education is concerned, I would not try to do so. In common with His 
Excellency, I have no doubt that the full-time approach which soon followed delivers a 
better educated product and is more likely to develop sound lawyers. 
Is the present approach the way that will carry us through, or at least well into, the new 
century? 
Let me digress for a moment to say that soon after I completed my studies, I found 
myself teaching one of the practical subjects, Civil Procedure, at eight o'clock in the 
morning on, as I recall, Mondays and Fridays. I say "found myself" advisedly. Procedure 
was a subject traditionally taught by a Chapman Tripp person. It was then taught by my 
mentor, friend and, later, partner Norman Morrison. He was not in good health and from 
time to time would ask me to take a lecture for him. This could be a bit nerve wracking; 
some of the students were older than I was, and if the phone call came after dinner on 
Sunday night, time for study of the next 15 pages of Sim was limited. Eventually I took 
over the teaching assignment officially. I suppose the experience stimulated what seems to 
have been a lifelong involvement with procedural rules. 
Over the years innumerable lawyers have come up to remind me I taught them all they 
knew about procedure and that this did not hinder their most successful careers in 
commercial law or conveyancing. One student I remember vividly, partly because he 
attended lectures dressed in full army uniform. The lectures were in one of the old rooms 
with a tiered wooden floor and long heavy benches on hinges. This gentleman invariably 
came in late, clattered down the ten flights of steps in his hobnailed army boots, made his 
way to the middle of the unoccupied front row and let go the bench seat with a resounding 
crash. After a while I learned it was best to suspend the lecture during the entrance of that 
distinguished advocate of the future, Michael Bungay. 
Before resuming let me return briefly to cui bono. I do not know to what extent the legal 
profession had a say in the approach to law teaching in the era I have been discussing, but 
in retrospect it may seem that the profession was the major beneficiary. It obtained a 
constantly renewing supply of messengers and law clerks at ridiculous rates of pay. 
Coming back to the future, it was not entirely for your entertainment that I referred to 
my brief experience in teaching. The point is, this was a long time ago. I am not in any way 
qualified to speak about the future of law teaching, and certainly not in the presence of the 
other distinguished members of today's panel and equally distinguished audience. 
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However, the prospectus for the seminar also refers to the future of the law. A 
contribution I possibly could make is to attempt a prediction or two about what the future 
holds for the practice of the law. This may be of some small help to others, better qualified 
than I, who will have the task of matching the educational system to the needs of the 
future. 
One of things that has continually struck me during the course of my career is the 
rapidity and comprehensiveness of the changes in the subject matter of legal work since I 
was a student. Sir Michael has already referred to the profound nature and extent of the 
advances in statute and common law. As he noted, much of the contract law we were 
taught became overlaid by a series of statutes. The whole emphasis of torts changed with 
ACC legislation. Whole rafts of new specialised subjects have arisen. One can confirm this 
by comparing the subject index of a current volume of the New Zealand Law Reports with 
one taken from the 1950s, or skimming through the latest issue of the Victoria University 
of Wellington Law Review, where one finds subjects such as international instruments in 
administrative decisions, Maori fisheries, child support, matrimonial property, alternative 
dispute resolution and advocates compensating litigants for bringing hopeless cases. None 
of these, one could safely say, would have attracted a Law Review article when I was a 
student, nor did any of them rate as much as a mention during the courses I attended. 
For the human race the great advances of the last 50 years have been founded on 
technology. Undoubtedly, they will continue for the next 50. As to the impact on law, in 
the immediate future we may see an emphasis on such topics, for example, as the legal 
consequences of genetic engineering, the impact of international electronic 
communications on contract law, the global protection of intellectual property and the 
resolution of transnational civil disputes. With a little ingenuity one might make a list of 
foreseeable future subject matter which, when grouped under convenient headings, could 
be made available as options in the law course. 
For myself, however, I doubt this will be the path of the future. One cannot hope to 
teach the unforeseen and the uninvented. 
Can we still recall our reactions on first reading Toffler's Future Shock, when it 
appeared in 1970? I suspect many thought it was ingenious but exaggerated. It referred to 
"the disease of change", and described persons overwhelmed by too rapid change. The 
human race has however proved resilient.  Is there the slightest reason to think that the 
rate of change will decelerate? I suggest not. 
For lawyers and judges, this is a challenging prospect; a frightening one if allowed to 
be. As a lawyer, I found that the subject matter of my caseload when I was in my 40s bore 
little resemblance to what I had dealt with 20 years earlier. In my years as a Judge I found I 
was mainly dealing with subject matter in which I had practised little as a lawyer. 
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Although I had had reasonably diverse experience of civil practice, the areas on which I 
had concentrated cropped up less and less in my daily judicial work. This trend I suspect 
will accelerate for future generations. And although this is not the point of today's 
discussions, it points up the need for attention to continuing education for both lawyers 
and the judiciary. 
In switching the crystal ball to another topic, the New Zealand courts system of the 
future, I appreciate that only a minority of today's students will follow a career as 
litigators. Nevertheless, the courts are responsible for a significant proportion of the law 
governing the daily lives of the community. Not to take into reckoning possible future 
changes in the court system and how it operates would be a significant omission. 
I have spoken in detail on the future shape of the court system on other occasions and 
of course any views I now express can only be personal ones. The Privy Council debate is a 
stark exception to the general speed of change. The issue has been debated endlessly 
without any sign of finality. Although in previous comments I have said the demise of the 
Privy Council appeal is inevitable, I have been wise enough, or cunning, never to predict 
when this might happen. The present answer is: when as a country we are able to agree on 
a substitute. An added complication is that, while this is true of lawyers, it is presently 
doubtful whether Maoridom would regard any substitute as satisfactory. 
The question of a solution to the Maori component of the problem is too complex and 
sensitive to be debated in the time available at this moment. 
Three or four main solutions are on offer to deal with the structure, should the Privy 
Council appeal cease to exist. For cases commenced in the High Court we could make do 
with a single right of appeal. That proposal, favoured in recent debate by many in the 
judiciary including myself, has been strongly opposed by the practising profession. We 
could create a new intermediate appeal court, sited between the High Court and the 
present Court of Appeal, the latter becoming the Supreme and final Court. Calculations 
have shown this would require the appointment of eight or nine more judges at the 
appellate level with the provision of a major new court building. Given our national 
resources, from a practical point of view, I regard this as an unlikely solution. 
Another possibility, occasionally advanced, is some kind of Australasian court, or pan-
Pacific body, as the Supreme Court. However, assuming that the foreign judges were to be 
in a minority, this does little to overcome the resource implications relating to a four-tiered 
structure. 
The remaining mainstream model is a three-tier structure in which the first level is the 
only court of originating jurisdiction, the High Court has appellate functions only and the 
Court of Appeal provides the second appeal. That was the Law Commission's proposal in 
1989, during Sir Owen Woodhouse's presidency, and in a recent talk on radio Sir Geoffrey 
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Palmer saw it as the likely shape of the future. I see some demerits, not the least the demise 
of the High Court as we know it, but it may be the only compromise capable of 
commanding sufficient acceptance. 
I have mentioned the topic of the future court structure mainly because it is an 
important issue which keeps slipping into the too-hard basket. During my term of office I 
did not actively campaign for abolition of the Privy Council appeal, taking the view that as 
with wigs, such changes generally find their own right moment, with a little help. But with 
this subject I feel a growing sense of impatience that the right moment has been overlong 
in coming. Without detracting from the past value of our access to the Law Lords, for a 
vibrant South Pacific nation, priding itself on independence and innovation, the Privy 
Council link must increasingly be seen as a fine concept whose time has now passed. 
I have said a little about the future subject matter that may come before the Courts and 
the likelihood that it will be something completely different. What about methodology? At 
a recent Asia-Pacific Court Conference an American speaker, Jim Dator, offered the 
opinion that what the public wanted was fair, speedy justice. He said they did not care 
whether they got it from a wigged barrister before a robed judge in a stuffy courtroom, or 
from a robot, or whether they settled their disputes peacefully between themselves 
without recourse to any third party at all. 
I think that is true so far as it goes. One aspect of fairness, however, must be certainty. 
Another, that like cases have a like outcome. I can imagine nothing more destructive to 
community confidence in the justice system than departure from those principles. 
The combination of adherence to a doctrine of precedent and the continued 
development of technology seems to carry the risk of an unmanageable overload of 
relevant precedents. Some years ago, before personal computers became generally 
available, a particularly assiduous counsel would sometimes cause amusement by citing, 
for example, a judgment of the District Court of Witwatersrand.  In the future such 
material will be even more readily available than it already is. In New Zealand at any rate, 
so far there has been no policy about placing limitations on the scope of material of this 
kind the courts are prepared to receive. Even in regard to indigenous materials, we do not 
exclude any. Occasionally appellate judgments will caution that the case is not to be taken 
as a precedent, but this seems ineffective in discouraging counsel from trying to use it just 
for that purpose. I was known to ask counsel to read out the relevant passage in the 
previous judgment, in case their copy said something different from mine. I would be 
interested to hear from Professor Hogg and Sir Geoffrey Palmer how North America has 
coped with these problems. I know that in California there is a formal court rule enabling 
judgments to be tagged to the effect that they are not to be cited. 
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We have a tradition in this country of writing judgments in such a way that they are 
self explanatory even to those unfamiliar with the issues. I wonder how long that can 
continue, especially in appellate courts. The technique enables the losing party to be 
satisfied that their case has received full attention, but if the system is to survive the 
appearances of absolute justice may have to undergo some sacrifices. 
In searching back for the principles according to which law was taught when I was a 
student I came across a tribute Professor Ian Campbell paid to the late Professor 
McGechan. In referring to the case method he said its essence was to take a concrete case in 
all its native complexity and study the competing principles within it. One of the major 
tasks of law, he said, was to reconcile and integrate human ideals. 
This led me to Oliver Wendell Holmes' aphorism that the law is not the place for poets 
or artists. The law is a calling for thinkers. 
I respectfully agree with His Excellency that the prime educational requirement for 
successful lawyers, practising or otherwise, is a broad-based education. As to the legal 
content, bearing in mind that little is predictable about the specific subject headings that 
will be useful to the lawyer or judge of 2050 except their unpredictability, rather than try to 
specify any curriculum, if I were starting with a blank sheet I would devise a teaching 
method that helped students acquire the skills they will need regardless of the subject 
matter on which they are working: skills of understanding, analysing, thinking, reasoning 
and writing. That I am sure is what the present course structure seeks to achieve. Whether 
it can be enhanced I must leave to the experts. 
I doubt that in this or anything else I have said I have told this distinguished and 
learned gathering anything you did not already know. I am proud to be one of the first 
century graduates of the Law Faculty of Victoria University. I have every confidence that 
the second century will be no less distinguished than the first. 
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